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Abstract 
Social theorists frequently argue that social cohesion is under threat in developed societies 
from the multiple pressures of globalisation. This article seeks to test this hypothesis through 
examining the trends across countries and regions in key indicators of social cohesion, 
including social and political trust, tolerance and perceptions of conflict. It finds ample 
evidence of long-term declines in cohesion in many countries, not least as exemplified by the 
erosion of social and political trust, which is particularly dramatic in the UK. The trends are 
not entirely convergent, since on most indicators Nordic countries has become more 
cohesive, yet each country faces challenges. In the final section the authors argue that 
different ‘regimes of social cohesion’ can be identified in specific clusters of countries which 
are based on different cultural and institutional foundations.  In the ‘liberal model’, which 
applies in the UK and the US, the greatest threat to cohesion comes not from increasing 
cultural diversity, but from increasing barriers to mobility and the subsequent atrophy of faith 
in individual opportunity and meritocratic rewards – precisely those beliefs which have 
traditionally held liberal societies together.     
 
1. Introduction 
This article reviews the state of social cohesion across a range of developed countries at the 
beginning of the second millennium. Social cohesion is defined in broad and non-normative 
terms as ‘the property by which whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound 
together through the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely 
on consensus rather than pure coercion’ (see Green and Janmaat, forthcoming).We explore a 
number of questions. What are the recent and long-term (post-1980) trends in different 
countries and regions on the key aspects and measures of social cohesion? Are they 
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converging or diverging? Do countries face similar or different pressures on the social fabric 
in the face of the economic crisis? Do some of us live in a ‘broken society’ - as Prime 
Minister David Cameron once described the UK - or are the bonds which bind societies still 
holding?  
We start in Section 2 by summarising some of the macro social theories concerning the 
impacts of social change on societal cohesion. These generally predict, for a variety of 
reasons, the increasing atomization of societies and a secular decline in social solidarity 
across the developed countries.  In Sections 3-4 we put these theories to the test, examining in 
some detail the trends across different countries and regions for key indicators of social 
cohesion, such as social and political trust, tolerance and perceptions of social conflict. 
Although confirming the general picture of declining social cohesion these trends shows 
patterns of divergence as well as convergence across regions (and country clusters). In 
Section 5 we posit the existence of different ‘regimes of social cohesion’, each resting on 
somewhat different cultural and institutional foundations, and suggest that these are 
vulnerable at different points to the various pressures of globalisation.  
 
2. Theories of social change and its impacts on Social Cohesion 
Contemporary macro social theories tend to equate globalisation with the general erosion of 
societal bonds at the national level. Social cohesion is undermined, they claim, by a variety of 
social trends, including the erosion of national/state identities, the rise of individualism and 
increasing structural inequalities in societies. These forces are seen to impact on all 
developed societies, and increasingly on the developing countries most affected by 
globalisation.   
To Castells, a leading theorist of globalisation, the weakening of the nation state - 
undermined by the global forces of transnational capitalism, cross-border crime, and space-
shrinking modern communications – poses a major challenge to social cohesion. The national 
state, and the collective state identities which it has fostered, were historically among the 
chief foundations of social cohesion - at least within states, if often not between them (and it 
is the intra-state dimension that social cohesion addresses). As the power and legitimacy of 
states has waned, individual and collective identification as state citizens has weakened, 
removing one of the primary social bonds. With increasing social and cultural diversification, 
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and the modern communication technologies which give voice to it, individuals have ceased 
to identify with the national collective, replacing their loyalty to the state with cosmopolitan 
supra-national loyalties or more localised or circumscribed identities based on ethnicity, 
region, religion and lifestyle. To Castells, this ‘dissolution of shared identities, which is 
tantamount to the dissolution of society as a meaningful social system, may well be the state 
of affairs of our time.’ (Castells, 1997, 355).  
Identity theorists have come to similar conclusions. Beck (1999, 2004) jettisons the nation 
state as a ‘zombie category’, castigating those who still think within its parameters as 
‘methodological nationalists’ who hang on to a conceptual framework which is now utterly 
obsolete. Both he and Giddens (1991), in the latter’s theory of ‘reflective modernisation’, 
have written of the increasing ‘individuation of society’, where individual life projects, 
involving multiple and shifting loyalties and identities, become the focus of identity 
formation.  Touraine (2000), likewise, sees modern advanced societies as experiencing both a 
secular the decline in the national bonds of citizenship and a rise in communitarian 
allegiances. ‘[T]here are more and more identity-based grouping and associations, sects, cults 
and nationalisms based on a common sense of belonging, and …they are becoming stronger.’ 
(ibid, 2). Globalisation and localisation combine pincer-wise to squeeze out identification 
with the national collective. With national society dead, we look to the personal life project 
for solutions.  ‘In a world of permanent and uncontrollable change,’ he writes,’  ‘the 
individual attempt to transform lived experiences into the construction of the self as an actor 
is the only stable point of reference.’ (ibid, 11).  
Castells, and other writers on globalisation such as Stiglitz (2004; 2010), also frequently note 
the growing structural inequalities in societies and see these as undermining social cohesion. 
The recent phase of globalisation has been accompanied by a massive increase in economic 
inequalities, not only between the richest and poorest countries but also within countries 
(Wade, 2001). According to one historical estimate, whilst the wealthiest 20 per cent of world 
population were three times richer than the poorest 20 per cent in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the ratio by the turn of the twentieth century was a staggering 86 to 1 (Martin and Schumann, 
1996). Most developed countries have experienced widening gaps in household incomes and 
wealth internally during the past 30 years (Esping-Andersen, 2005). Income distribution has 
become more unequal partly because of the effects of the global division of labour and skills-
biased technological change. As technology has raised the demands for skills in most jobs in 
developed countries, those with less education and fewer skills have found themselves at a 
 4 
disadvantage in the labour market. Competition from low-wage developing countries, 
combined with the weakening of trade unions bargaining power in some developed countries, 
has driven down wages for less skilled jobs in the developed countries, thus pulling out the 
wage distribution at the bottom. (Hutton, 2002; Thurow, 1996). At the same time wages at 
the very top have escalated as the corporate elites have exploited the relaxed attitudes towards 
extreme financial rewards which have prevailed in many countries, as well the new 
possibilities hiking remuneration packages through new instruments such as bonuses, stock 
options, and tax-avoidance schemes. Wealth inequalities have also soared in many countries, 
not only because of the massive gaps in pay, but because of the opportunities for further 
wealth accumulation for those with capital from investment in property assets whose values 
have constantly inflated (Stiglitz, 2004; 2010).  
 
Increasing inequality has been linked with a multitude of social ills, including lower levels of 
public health; higher rates of crime, mental illness and depression; and lower levels of self-
reported well-being and happiness (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Extreme inequalities, of 
course, also produce the potential for civil conflict, particularly when the resources to be 
distributed are diminished. As we have recently seen in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
and global economic recession, where countries are faced with years of austerity while 
governments pay back the debts incurred in bailing out the banks, sharp conflicts can emerge 
over how the pain is distributed. However, the effects of extreme inequality on social 
cohesion can also be more subtle and insidious.  
Inequality increases the social distance between groups, undermining inter-group trust and 
reducing the sense of common citizenship. As Reich has argued with respect to the USA, 
with growing income and wealth gaps disparate sections in society no longer feel they have a 
common interest and a mutual responsibility for each other. They are no longer members of 
the same society. At the extreme, as in the USA, the rich begin to secede from the public 
realm altogether. Ensconced in their semi-autonomous and privately-policed ‘gated 
communities’, they eschew the public services on which the rest of society depend, and 
become oblivious to the way most people live.  At the same time, the poor are increasingly 
marginalised from society; excluded by their inability to find work, or by their meagre pay, 
from buying housing or healthcare; unable to access decent schools; and in many cases forced 
into urban ghettoes where they interact only with others in similarly deprived conditions 
(Hutton, 2002; Reich, 2001). 
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Large income gaps are quite easily transformed into even larger wealth gaps (Dorling, 2009). 
These lock in social disadvantage over generations and curtail social mobility. As research 
has repeatedly shown (Esping-Andersen, 2005), the most unequal societies are usually those, 
like the US and the UK, with relatively low levels of social mobility. The greater the pay 
gaps, the less chance of movement between classes since there is so much further to travel 
between them. Wealth inequality, as Durkheim (1964) noted, can often be more damaging to 
social cohesion than income inequality, particularly where many individuals appear to derive 
their wealth from inheritance or asset price inflation rather than through ability and hard 
work. Incomes tend to rise and fall during different phases of the lifecycle so that people on 
low incomes at particular points in their lives can take comfort from the hope that better times 
are around the corner. Capital seems to have more permanence, and because most of it is 
inherited, not earned, it locks in inequalities across generations (Dorling, 2009). The lack of it 
can act as a long-term exclusionary mechanism, as in countries where housing is so 
expensive relative to incomes that lack of capital that becomes the main barrier to home 
ownership. Likewise social immobility can do more to undermine social cohesion than 
income inequality, since it gradually erodes the belief in meritocracy and just rewards that is 
at the heart of the social contract, particularly in the liberal states.  
Another growing divide in advanced societies, according to Willetts (2010), is that between 
generations. A sizeable proportion of the so-called ‘baby-boomer’ generation - those born 
roughly between 1940 and 1965 in the West – were lucky. Many of them who started work in 
the sixties benefitted from plentiful jobs and rising incomes, particularly at the lower end. 
They, and the boomers who came after, bought properties when they were still affordable, 
saw their wealth increase dramatically as housing prices rose, and looked forward to retiring 
at 60 or 65 with generous company pensions based on their final salaries. They had smaller 
families than their parents’ generation and this, combined with their much higher, often dual, 
incomes, allowed vastly greater household consumption (Willetts, 2010). They were a large 
cohort and commanded considerable political power, the strength of their ‘grey’ vote later 
ensuring few governments would dare challenge the advantages they received from the 
inflation of their housing assets or from generous public health care they received when they 
were older.  
Many members of the generations that succeeded them were less lucky. With birth rates 
declining in most countries, they were less numerous and had less electoral clout. They 
benefitted from rising incomes but were born too late to claim the windfall from the housing 
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boom enjoyed by their parents. The latest generation will be the worst off, according to 
Willets (2010). In most countries those leaving education now will find it hard to get jobs, 
and the jobs they do get will be less secure. Graduates must often pay back substantial 
student loans and are unlikely to see the same return to graduate qualifications as previous 
generations. They will find it hard to afford to buy a house and even those who can are 
unlikely ever to pay off their mortgages. They will effectively be permanent renters of their 
properties from their loan companies. But at least they will be more secure that those renting 
in the private market or relying on the much reduced stocks of social housing. And all of 
them will be paying the higher taxes necessary to pay off the vast public debts incurred by 
governments bailing out the bankers of previous generations. They will no doubt have to 
work until they are 70 and will rarely receive the generous company pensions enjoyed by 
their parents - for which, in many countries, the young have been paying through their taxes 
or pension contributions. In many countries, for the generation reaching maturity now, their 
prospects relative to those of their parents’ generation are arguably worse than those for any 
generation since the one that went to fight in the First World War. Of course, some will be 
better off than others, depending on what they have inherited from their parents, and the 
advantages they have received from their education.  But the potential for conflict between 
generations has never been greater. 
 
3. Convergence or Divergence? 
These general theories posit universal shifts. They argue that secular changes are occurring in 
the fundamental structures of all advanced societies and assume that these are more or less 
convergent - or at the least uni-directional - trends. But how far does the empirical evidence 
support this thesis? We look here at long-term trends in measures of social trust, political 
trust, tolerance and perceptions of conflict between groups.  
Trust 
Interpersonal or ‘social’ trust has often been considered one of the key measures of social 
cohesion (Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006; Reeskens, 2007; Uslaner, 2002;). It relates to 
people’s willingness to place their confidence in a wide range of others, including people 
they do not know. And it is widely considered to be an important precondition for the 
functioning of modern societies where a highly evolved division of labour means that 
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everyday activities often involve interactions with strangers. Trust is necessary for the 
legitimacy of democratic systems which require that we trust the politicians we elect to 
deliver their pledges. It is also a precondition for welfare states which redistribute resources 
towards the needy because they depend on people trusting that if they pay their taxes to 
support others in need, these will not abuse the system, and others in turn will pay theirs to 
support them if they are in need (Canovan, 1996). Trust is also essential for efficient 
economic activity which depends on people sticking to what they have agreed and 
performing their contracts. The higher the levels of trust and trustworthiness the less the need 
for legal contracts and lawyers for every transaction and thus the lower are transaction costs 
(North, 1990). Above all, trust is what allows people to go about their daily business without 
constant fear of being let down or cheated. This general form of trust has been widely 
identified as necessary for a substantial range of private and public goods in society. If we 
believe the correlational evidence, it is closely associated with economic and social outcomes 
as diverse as economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), innovation (Osberg, 2003), public 
health (Wilkinson, 1996), better government (Putnam, 2000) and general well-being and 
happiness (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).   
Social trust is usually measured by the survey question which asks: ‘Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?’ It can be objected that the question is not entirely clear about the range of people in 
question, but factor analysis suggests that respondents do indeed interpret the question in 
terms of how much they trust strangers (Uslaner, 2002). Other statistical tests also suggest 
that the measure is relatively robust. For instance, ‘Dropped wallet’ experiments conducted in 
different countries show that in countries with high levels of measured trust more of these 
wallets are returned. There is also a strong correlation between measured levels of trust in 
particular countries and the perception of foreigners as to how far people can be trusted in 
these countries, suggesting that trust and perceptions of trustworthiness are closely related 
(Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006). Results from repeated surveys in different countries over 
50 years do show considerable consistency in the international patterns of trust. There are 
very large differences between countries in how far people say they trust each other and these 
differences remain relatively stable over time. 
We know relatively little about how trust arises. Putnam has argued (2000) that trust derives  
from participation in groups; that it arises out of the repeated interactions between individuals 
in associations bound by collective norms. We learn to trust through successful cooperation 
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with others in pursuing common objectives. He supports this with evidence from the US that 
people who join associations are more likely to be trusting. However, as others have shown, 
this correlation does not hold in all countries (Newton, 1999), let alone across countries 
(Green et al, 2006; Uslaner, 2002). There is no significant relationship between levels of trust 
in a country and the frequency with which its people join organisations. Even if the US data 
do show a correlation between trust and association, Putnam is unable to show which way the 
causality runs. It may well be that it is because people trust that they are more willing to join 
associations, rather than the other way around. 
Uslaner (2002) provides a more nuanced analysis of the nature of trust. He distinguishes 
between ‘strategic trust’, which depends on a calculation of whether given others are 
trustworthy, and ‘moral trust,’ which is based on fundamental character traits, such as 
optimism and ‘sense of control,’ which encourage people to believe that people should be 
trusted. The first is contingent and subject to change depending on the context and the 
experience of the others in question. The second does not depend so much on social context 
and experience and is more stable over time. Moral trust, he says, is learnt early on in life 
from parents and will be relatively enduring. ‘Collectively,’ he writes, ‘the most optimistic 
person – who wants a fulfilling job, thinks about the future, and believes that she can make it 
regardless of luck, connections, or current circumstances – is 36 percent  more likely to trust 
others than the most convinced pessimist.’ (Uslaner, 2002, 13).  
Research from the field of psychology provides some evidence to confirm the conjecture that 
early childhood experiences have a significant influence on adult trust. Studies using UK 
longitudinal datasets such as the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the British 
Cohort Study (BCS70) find that levels of adult political trust are predicted to some extent by 
parental class at birth and intelligence measured during childhood (Deary et al, 2008; Schoon 
et al, 2010; Sturgis et al, 2010). In another study based on these datasets Schoon and Cheng 
(in press) also found a significant association between school motivation at teen age and 
political trust in early adulthood in both NCDS and BCS70 cohorts born in 1958 and 1970 
(r=.23 in NCDS and r=.24 in BCS70, p<.001).  In our own recent work we have looked at the 
associations between family social class, childhood and teenage emotional disorder, and adult 
social trust in the British cohort studies NCDS and BCS70. As can be seen from Table 1, 
both parental social class and early emotional disorder tended to influence adult social trust in 
an expected direction: participants from higher social class families tend to score higher on 
social trust in their early adulthood; participants’ childhood and teenage emotional 
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Table 1. Pearson correlations among parental social class, childhood and teenage 
emotional disorder, and adult social trust in NCDS and BCS70 
NCDS (N=8,663) 
Variables  Gender Parental 
social 
class 
Emotional 
disorder 
(age 11) 
Emotional 
disorder 
(age 16) 
Social trust 
(age 33) 
Gender 
 
.51 
(.50) 
_     
Parental  
social class
1 
3.22 
(1.21) 
   -.25* _    
Emotional 
disorder
2
 
(age 11) 
1.50 
(1.34) 
   .030*   .005 _   
Emotional 
disorder 
(age 16) 
.88 
(1.14) 
  .153***   .004  .369***  _  
Social trust
3
 
(age 33) 
2.75 
(0.68) 
  .067***   .057*** -.032*** -.039*** _ 
 
BCS70 (N=8,696) 
Variables  Gender  Parental 
social 
class 
Emotional 
disorder 
(age 10) 
Emotional 
disorder 
(age 16) 
Social trust 
(age 34) 
Gender 
 
.52 
(.50) 
_     
Parental  
social class 
3.36 
(1.21) 
   -.01 _    
Emotional 
disorder
2
  
(age 10) 
25.76 
(19.28) 
   .043**  -.031* _   
Emotional 
disorder  
(age 16) 
.90 
(1.13) 
  .139***  -.029*  .375***  _  
Social trust
3
  
(age 34) 
2.78 
(0.66) 
  .038**   .121*** -.024 -.078*** _ 
Note: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.  Standard deviations (SD) are given in parentheses; Variables were scored 
such that a higher score indicated  high status on parental social class at birth, greater emotional disorder in 
childhood and at age 16, and high social trust at age 33 in NCDS and 34 in BCS70.  
Measures 
1. Parental social class. In both NCDS and BCS70 social class is measured by the Registrar General’s measure 
of social class where class is defined according to job status and the associated education level, prestige (Office 
of Population Censuses and Surveys and Employment Department Group, 1980) or lifestyle (Marsh, 1986) and 
is assessed by the current or last held job. It is divided into six ordinal categories (I Managerial, II Professional, 
III non manual, III manual, IV semiskilled, V unskilled). Class I represents the highest level of prestige or skill 
and class V the lowest. Where there was no father in the household, the social class of the mother was used. 
2. The emotional disorder scale comprised of three items from a modified version of the Rutter A Scale (Rutter, 
Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970). In the BCS70 cohort, at age 10 only, the parent was asked to complete the items of 
the Rutter A scale on an analogous scale which, using an automated marking system, yielded a score between 0 
(does not apply) and 100 (certainly applies) for each item. The emotional disorder score is obtained by summing 
the scores of three items: is “tearful or distressed”, is “often worried/worries about many things”, and is 
“fearful/afraid of new things” (range 0–6). 
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3. Social trust was captured in the NCDS at age 33 with a single-item measure. Cohort members were asked 
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?’ The item  tapping social trust in the BCS70 at age 34 was worded differently. Cohort members 
were asked “How much do you trust people in your local area?” (1 = not at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = a fair 
amount, 4 = a lot). 
 
disorder tended to have negative effects on their social trust later on. Further, in both cohorts, 
women had higher scores on social trust in both NCDS and BCS cohorts.  
Unfortunately, the UK longitudinal data cannot tell us whether trust remains stable over the 
life course.  NCDS does ask about trust at two points, at 33 and 46 years, but the questions 
are asked differently and the answers cannot be compared. Uslaner provides some evidence, 
from a US panel survey conducted in 1965, 1973 and 1982,
2
 which indicates the relative 
stability of trusting attitudes. On his analysis, almost two thirds of young people and more 
than 70 percent of their parents were consistent ‘trusters’ or ‘mis-trusters’ throughout the 
very different decades of the 1960s and 1970s. (Uslaner, op cit, P. 10). On the other hand, the 
data also suggest that context and experience may have altered levels of trust in a third of 
cases, which could have quite substantial effects on aggregate trends if the changes are 
mostly in the same direction. Cohort analysis using cross-sectional data doesn’t really help us 
to answer the question either, since we never know whether differences between cohorts at 
different times are due to period or life cycle or cohort effects. In any case the findings from 
studies differ. Cross-country data for 1959 provided by Almond and Verba (1963) suggested 
that older and younger people were equally likely to trust. However, Hall (1999), using data 
from the repeated waves of the World Values Survey, found that people over 30 years were 
more trusting in 1981 than people under 30 and that the age differential had increased by 
1990.   
What we do know – and what must considerably qualify any explanation of trust based 
purely on the effects of early parenting – is that levels of trust vary massively across 
countries, from less than ten per cent in Brazil and Turkey, for instance, to over 60 per cent in 
Norway and Sweden (Delhey and Newton, 2005). Aggregate levels of trust in different 
countries do change over time, but the patterns across countries show considerable regularity. 
We also know that average levels of trust tend to vary by social class, with the more affluent 
more inclined to trust than others lower down the income scale (Hall, 1999). These social 
variations suggests that although being trusting is an individual disposition, which may well 
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owe in part to deep-seated personality traits, it is also strongly influenced by societal 
contexts. People are more likely to trust as adults if others are trustworthy. So trust is not only 
fundamental to the functioning of societies. It is also a product of how societies function.  
What the trend data on aggregate levels of social trust in different countries show is quite 
startling and extremely worrisome from the point of view of social cohesion. Figures 1 and 2, 
drawn from different data sets, show the trends in aggregate levels of trust between 1981 and 
2009.  Figure 1, based on World Values Survey data, averages the aggregate levels of trust 
for countries in a number of country groups, and shows that for three out of five of them - the 
‘liberal’, ‘southern European’ and ‘east Asian’ groups - trust declined significantly between 
1981 and 2005, while it remained flat in the ‘social market’ group.3 For more recent years we 
only have data from European Social Survey and Eurobarometer for a small number of 
countries. These surveys use the same question as the World Values Survey, but, unlike the 
latter, which demands dichotomous yes or no answers, allow answers on a scale.
4
 Figure 2, 
which standardizes the scales, provides values for the period 2002 until 2009 for a few 
individual countries. In most cases there is a further dramatic decline in levels of trust. 
Following a period of reasonably stability from 2000 to 2005, there is a sharp decline in 
average levels of trust in Germany, Spain, and the UK.  Even Sweden shows declining levels 
of trust after 2008, coinciding with the economic crisis.  
 
Figure 1  Trends in Social Trust (% most people can be trusted) 
                                                          
3
 In order to avoid the more populous countries dominating the country groups we gave the country aggregate 
scores equal weight when calculating the group means. 
4 In ESS the item had a 0-10 scale (0 “can’t be too careful “---- 10 “most people can be trusted”) while in the EB it had a 1-
10 scale (1 “can’t be too careful” ---- 10 “most people can be trusted”). To make the answers comparable we subtracted the 
EB scale with 0.5. As a result, the midpoint in the scale for both the ESS and EB item is 5. 
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Source: World Values Survey data for 1981, 1990, 2000, 2005. These data can be obtained at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
 Note: Our labelling of country groups as liberal, social democratic and was inspired by an historical  analysis of 
the different intellectual traditions of writings on social cohesion in political philosophy, political economy and 
sociology and also through a critical reading of  the contemporary literature on welfare regimes (e.g. Esping- 
Andersen, 1990) and varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001). Elsewhere we tested whether the 
regimes and varieties identified by these scholars also applied for social cohesion. Using a variety of techniques 
such as cluster analysis, composite indicators and factor analysis to explore country clusterings, we indeed 
found a large overlap between welfare regimes / varieties of capitalism and social cohesion regimes, but we also 
made some modifications to the country groups (Green et al , 2009).  The groups presented here represent these 
modifications. We distinguish the following groups:  a ‘Liberal’ group , including the UK, the US, Canada and 
Australia; a ‘Social Democratic’ group, comprised of  Denmark, Sweden and Norway; a ‘Social Market’ group, 
including West Germany, France and the Netherlands; a ‘Southern European’ group, made up of Spain and 
Italy, and an ‘East Asian’ group including Japan and South Korea. For Figures 1, 4 and 10-15 we made sure that 
the country groups comprise these same countries for each point in time.  
 
Figure 2 Trends in Social Trust (mean of 0-10 scale) 
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Source: European Social Survey (ESS) rounds 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 and the Eurobarometer 72.1 (Sept-
Oct 2009). The ESS data can be obtained at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. The Eurobarometer data can 
be obtained at http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/recherche-datenzugang/zacat-online-study-catalogue/ 
We cannot compare the values on the two graphs, since they are based on surveys using 
different scales, so we cannot say exactly how far trust has declined overall. But what we can 
see is that there was a general decline in levels of trust (albeit with some fluctuations) in the 
24 year period from 1981 to 2005 in the English-speaking and southern European groups of 
countries and that in certain countries from each group (the UK for the English-speaking 
countries and Germany and Spain for the continental European countries) this continued over 
the next decade, although France defies the trend in the final two-year period. The countries 
with the most severe declines in trust appear to be the US and the UK. If we include in the 
time series Almond and Verba’s (1963) 1959 figures for the UK and the US (Figure 3), again 
based on comparable survey questions, we can see that trust in the UK dropped 
catastrophically from just under 60 per cent of people saying they generally trusted others in 
1959 to around 30 per cent in 2005 (30.4 percent). The figure for the US dropped from 
around 60 per cent to just over 40 per cent.
5
 
Figure 3. Trends in social trust (percentage saying “most people can be trusted”) 
                                                          
5
 It could be argued that in order to  control for the effect of short term economic fluctuations on trust one 
should ideally measure long-term trends in trust using points in time when the economy was in similar states 
(i.e. using either moments of boom or moments of recession). However, data limitations prevented us from 
doing so. Moreover, it cannot automatically be assumed that trust always declines in periods of recession and 
always rises in periods of growth. Actually, if an economic fluctuation effect does exist, the long term declines 
in trust for the liberal and southern European groups recorded in Figure 1 would even become more pronounced 
as the start of the time series (1981) fell in a period of recession (depressing trust levels) and the end of the time 
series (2005) marked a period of economic growth (enhancing trust levels). 
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 Sources: Almond and Verba (1963); World Values Survey, Waves 1-5 (see footnote to figure 1). 
 
In as much as trust is an important measure for social cohesion, these trends in levels of trust 
would appear to confirm, at least partially, the general theories discussed above which posit 
universal and convergent changes in levels of social cohesion. However, there is a major 
exception.  Levels of trust rose significantly in the Nordic group of countries between 1985 
and 2005 and continued to rise after this in Sweden until 2008.  
The same divergence between the Nordic and other countries also seems to apply with 
respect to the trends in political trust. Political trust, or trust in (government) institutions, is 
generally thought to be closely linked to general or interpersonal trust (Delhey and Newton, 
2005; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). At the individual level, it may have 
some common origins in early childhood with general trust, but it is also subject to changes 
throughout the life course due to learning and experience. Some longitudinal studies find it 
declines with age (Schoon et al, 2010). But it is most certainly also affected by societal 
context and, like social trust, varies substantially across countries.  
As with social trust, political trust – measured here in terms of confidence in parliament - has 
declined markedly over the past three decades in many advanced countries. Figure 4 shows 
large declines in the liberal and social market groups between 1981 and 2005. Figure 5 shows 
continuing declines after 2001 in Germany, France, Spain and the UK, with the steepest 
declines after 2008, as one would expect. The major exception again appears to be the Nordic 
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countries. The average level of political trust for these countries increased during the 1981-
2005 period, when it was falling in most other countries, and it stabilized in Sweden right 
until the end of 2009. Sweden thus did not experience the sharp decline in political trust that 
the other countries did in the year that the crisis kicked in. 
 
Figure 4  Trends in Political Trust (% very much and quite a lot of  
confidence in parliament) 
 
Source: World Values Survey (see notes for Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Trends in Political Trust (trust in parliament; mean of 0-10 scale)  
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Sources: European Social Survey and Eurobarometer (see notes for Figure 2). 
 
It is also interesting to examine trends in trust by birth cohort as the economic crisis is likely 
to have affected age groups differently. The young, who are often working in temporary jobs, 
are much more likely to have lost their jobs than the older generations because cutting back 
on temporary staff is usually one of the first measures that employers take when confronted 
with an economic crisis. Because the crisis is likely to have hit the young harder, we would 
expect them to show the steepest drop in trust. Figures 6 and 7 which are based on the pooled 
data of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, France and Spain, show that social and 
political trust have indeed declined most in the younger age groups from 2006 to 2009. Social 
trust declined in all age groups to levels below the midpoint of the scale (indicating on 
balance more distrust than trust), but the fall was particularly pronounced in the cohorts born 
after 1964. Political trust was already at levels below the midpoint of the scale in 2006 and 
has fallen even further in 2009 in all age groups. Again the younger generations show the 
most significant drops, particularly those born between 1965 and 1984. In fact, while the 
younger age groups showed slightly higher levels of both social and political trust in 2006, 
the correlation was decidedly reversed in 2009 with the older generations exhibiting higher 
trust levels.
6
 
                                                          
6
 It could be argued that these findings are nothing special if attitudes like trust are generally more fluctuating 
among younger cohorts. However, other research investigating long term trends in social attitudes finds younger 
and older cohorts to show the same short term variations in attitudes (e.g. Inglehart 1997: famous graph). This  
further underlines the significance of the current findings. 
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Figure 6 
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Source: European Social Survey round 2006 and the Eurobarometer (see notes for Figure 2). 
 
However, the pooled data of Figures 6 and 7 is likely to hide important differences between 
countries. Because of differences in labour market institutions and policies the young in 
different countries are likely to be affected in different ways by the economic crisis. In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, with its flexible labour markets, many youngsters with fixed 
term contracts may have become unemployed but they may have had less difficulty in finding 
new work. By contrast, in the more regulated labour markets of the social market and 
southern European countries, where youth unemployment was already at relatively high 
levels, the crisis is likely to have prolonged the long-term unemployment of youngsters and 
thus to have given rise to widespread feelings of exclusion and discontent (see also the 
discussion of the social market regime further below). Figures 8 and 9 indeed show 
remarkable differences between – in this case – Germany and the United Kingdom. While 
both social and political trust levels have fallen at practically the same rate in all age groups 
in the United Kingdom, trust has declined markedly more among the younger cohorts in 
Germany. Here, political trust among the oldest age group has even increased. 
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Figure 7 
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Source: European Social Survey round 2006 and the Eurobarometer (see notes for Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
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Source: European Social Survey round 2006 and the Eurobarometer (see notes for Figure 2). 
 
Tolerance 
Tolerance is another characteristic often associated with socially cohesive societies, although 
it has arguably received more emphasis, historically, in liberal political philosophy than in 
other traditions.  The contemporary empirical evidence suggests that it is a highly context-
contingent characteristic, varying considerably by social group within countries, and subject, 
at the national level, to considerable swings over time (Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006). 
Although in some countries tolerance and other measures of social capital seem to go hand in 
hand at the individual level (Putnam, 2000), this is not true in all countries. Aggregate 
national levels of trust and tolerance do not co-vary across countries (Green et al, 2006). 
Nevertheless, for many people tolerance would be considered a sine qua non of social 
cohesion. The World Values Survey measures tolerance by asking respondents if they mind 
having immigrants as neighbours. The question might be thought to go pretty close to the 
heart of the matter, thus providing a fairly good proxy for tolerance. But it only taps attitudes 
towards immigrants and not towards other minority groups.   
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Figure 10 Trends in Tolerance (% not minding having immigrants as neighbours) 
 
Source: World Values Survey (see notes for Figure 1). 
 
The World Values Survey data shows that the trends on this measure are, indeed, quite 
country specific. Between 1981 and 2005, tolerance increased substantially in Germany until 
2001, before falling off slightly, whereas it declined precipitously in France, particularly after 
2001. The US shows a steady but small decline, and likewise the UK, after a small rise in the 
80s. Sweden, on the other hand, manifested a decline in tolerance in the 80s but subsequently 
showed a substantial rise which left levels higher level in 2005 than in 1981. If we average 
the values for different country groups (see Figure 10), one can see a very slight decline for 
the liberal group, a sharp decline for the social market group (presumably driven to a 
considerable extent by France), but a small rise for the social democratic countries, due to the 
significant increases after the 1980s. Although some variation between countries in each 
group warns against placing too much stress on the regional patterns, there is some evidence 
again of divergent trends between the Nordic and other groups of countries.    
Conflict 
Another useful measure of social cohesion is the perceived level of tension between different 
social groups. We have 2009 data from Euro barometer for a sizeable number of countries on 
perceived tensions between rich and poor, managers and workers, generations and different 
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ethnic groups. Figures 11 to 14 show the average for each country group, with the bars 
showing confidence intervals
7
. The values range between 1 – ‘no tension’ and 3 – ‘a lot of 
tension.’ The mean values and confidence intervals show that perceptions of tension are 
significantly lower in the social democratic countries by comparison to the other groups in 
the first three figures but not in the fourth.    
 
Figure 11 Perceived Tension between Rich and Poor (1 – no tension; 3 – a lot of 
tension) 
 
Source: Euro barometer 72.1 (Sept-Oct 2009). See notes for Figure 2. 
Figure 11 shows that tensions between the rich and poor are perceived to be highest in the 
transition and social market countries but substantially lower in the Nordic countries. Figure 
12 again shows that perceptions of tensions between managers and workers are highest in the 
social market group of countries, southern Europe and in the transition group (eastern 
Europe). They are somewhat lower in the liberal group and substantially lower in the social 
democratic group. The perception of tensions between generations (Figure 13) is also highest 
in the transition countries and lowest in the social democratic group, with the liberal  
 
                                                          
7 The EB asked the following question: “In all countries there sometimes exists tension between social groups. 
In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of the following groups in [COUNTRY]?” [1 no 
tension; 2 some tension; 3 a lot of tension] 
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Figure  12 Perceived Tension between Managers and Workers by Regime 
  
Source: Eurobarometer 72.1 (Sept-Oct 2009). See notes for Figure 2. 
 
 
.  
Figure 13  Perceived Tension between Young and Old by Regime 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 72.1 (Sept-Oct 2009). See notes for Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
Figure 14 Perceived  Tension between Different Ethnic Groups by Regime 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 72.1 (Sept-Oct 2009). See notes for Figure 2. 
 
 
When it comes to perceptions of tension between ethnic groups (Figure 14), however, the 
social democratic group tops the ranking order, along with the transition countries. The social 
market group follows shortly after. Levels of perceived tensions between ethnic groups are 
relatively low in the liberal and southern European countries.  
On three of the four measures of perceived conflict, then, the Nordic countries again show 
themselves to be quite distinctive. The social democratic regime appears to have maintained 
greater solidarity than the others between social classes and generations. However, this is not 
extended to ethnic groups. 
 
4. The Decline of Social Cohesion and the Nordic Exception. 
The major theories of social change identify powerful forces which undermine social 
cohesion in modern developed societies. Globalisation, increasing social inequality and 
generational division, and the proliferation of individualism and identity politics, all, it is 
argued, portend an ongoing fracturing of society and the weakening of collective social 
bonds. Trends on some of the key measures of social cohesion, analysed above, generally 
support this contention. Trust in others, trust in parliament and tolerance of immigrants all 
appear to be in decline in most regions of the developed world. With the social effects of the 
global recession still unfolding, it is likely that other measures of social conflict and division, 
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such as industrial conflict and civil unrest, will also be on the rise. However, our analysis 
suggests that this is not an entirely convergent trend. In one region at least, social cohesion 
appears to have been sustained, if not strengthened. The Nordic countries seem to be 
substantially more trusting and slightly more tolerant than they were 30 years ago. 
Perceptions of conflicts between social groups and generations seem also to be lower in this 
region than elsewhere. How can we explain this apparent exceptionalism? 
Scholars and commentators have given most attention to the question of trust – the area 
where Nordic exceptionalism is most pronounced. Popular wisdom has it that small and 
homogenous societies are more likely to be trusting and that we should not therefore be 
surprised that the Nordic countries have a greater propensity towards trusting than other more 
populous and more diverse societies. Statistical analysis only partially supports this 
explanation, however. In cross-country analysis population size and density do not correlate 
with levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2005). Some less populous countries, like 
Denmark, do have high levels of trust. Others, like Portugal, do not. Conversely, some very 
populous countries, like Brazil, have very low levels of trust, whereas others, like Japan and 
Canada, are amongst the most trusting.  Analyses of the relations between ethnic and cultural 
diversity and trust have also to date produced rather contradictory results. In a series of cross-
national and cross-area analyses, Alesina and Ferrara (2003), Knack and Keefer (1997), 
Putnam (2000, 2007), Uslaner (2002) and Helliwell (2003) all find that increasing diversity 
reduces average levels of trust. Putnam claims, in his analyses across areas in the US 
(Putnam, 2007), that diversity reduces trust both within and across groups, even when we 
control for other factors, such as income inequality. However, other studies, using appropriate 
controls, have found no relation between diversity and trust, either at the cross-national level 
(Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006; Hooghe et al, 2009) or in cross-area analyses in Canada 
(Johnson and Soroka, 1999) and the UK (Lekti, 2006).  
One of the most exhaustive analyses of trust and diversity, which explicitly seeks to provide 
an explanation of Nordic exceptionalism, is the study by Delhey and Newton (2005). In an 
analysis of 55 countries with data from the World Values Survey, they find that high trust 
societies are generally: wealthy, egalitarian, well-governed, protestant and relatively 
homogenous. Even when the Nordic countries are removed from the sample, these 
correlations remain significant, although they are weaker. Delhey and Newton (2005) claim 
that Protestantism and ethnic fractionalisation together explain 46 per cent of the variance in 
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trust across countries. However, as they admit, when you control for good governance and 
social spending, the significance of these factors declines markedly.  
The explanations of Nordic exceptionalism based on cultural homogeneity in cross-sectional 
analyses are somewhat inconclusive. If you look at the trends, they appear even weaker. 
Nordic countries have become more trusting over a period when they have become 
substantially more diverse. Immigrants in Denmark were only 3.1 percent of the population 
in 1980 but 10.6 percent in 2009. In Sweden the proportion rose from four percent of the 
population in 1960 to 13.8 percent in 2009 (Larsen, 2009). By 2008, 18 percent of the 
Swedish population had foreign origins (nine percent if you exclude Finns) and 14 percent 
were foreign-born. Sweden has a higher proportion of people of migrant stock than all but 
eight of the 26 OECD countries for which we have data - higher than France, Germany and 
the UK. Yet it ranked second highest on levels of trust (1999 wave) - far higher than other 
less diverse societies.  
The most convincing explanations of Nordic exceptionalism seem to relate to the 
fundamental characteristics of social democracy. Nordic countries are substantially more 
egalitarian than most developed countries. Despite small rises in household income inequality 
in the past two decades, Nordic countries remain the most income-equal in the developed 
world, and substantially more equal as a group than any of the other groups (see Figure 15). 
They also have the most universalistic welfare states.  
Figure  15 Trends in Income Inequality (OECD gini) 
 
Source: OECD (2010). http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INEQUALITY 
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As we have seen, many cross-national studies of trust find a positive relationship to 
egalitarianism (Green, Preston and Janmaat, 2006; Uslaner, 2003).  As Uslaner has argued, 
relative equality promotes solidarity because people feel more or less in the same boat. 
Inequality increases the social and cultural distance between groups and makes trusting more 
difficult. Likewise, universalistic welfare systems, because they include everyone on the 
same terms, promote the sense of solidarity and connectedness between social groups. 
Indeed, they also depend on it since such welfare systems can rarely be won politically if 
such solidarity does not exist. This creates a circular, mutually reinforcing syndrome of social 
responsibility which makes trusting more likely. It also promotes trust in the political system 
which is seen to help everyone. A more psychological explanation of the relationship 
between equality and trust is also plausible. As Wilkinson argues (1996), inequality increases 
high stakes competition in society which is likely, in turn, to lead to greater status anxiety and 
stress. Stress has been shown to underlie many manifestations of poor physical and mental 
health. It may also be un-conducive to trusting. It is quite possible, as our longitudinal data 
for the UK suggest (Table 1), that children growing up in highly stressed family 
environments acquire personality traits (such as anxiety, introversion and pessimism) which 
inhibit the development of trust. Trusting probably occurs through a combination of early 
childhood learning and adult experiences. 
 
5. Social Cohesion Regimes and the Global Economic Crisis  
The analysis, above, of key indicators of social cohesion suggest both convergence and 
divergence across countries and regions. There is ample evidence to suggest that overall 
cohesion in the advanced countries and regions in the West is in decline. However, the trends 
are not uniform. In the Nordic region, at least, the trends on a number of key indicators 
suggest a consolidation, if not strengthening, of social cohesion.  
However, this approach, which compares countries along linear scales for particular 
indicators, only just begins to capture the complex changes in the nature of social bonding 
which are occurring in different societies and regions, because what holds different societies 
together is never identical. As we have argued elsewhere (Green and Janmaat, forthcoming) 
there are actually quite different historical traditions of social cohesion in the West, each 
based on distinctive institutional and cultural foundations. For specific historical periods, 
defined by relatively stable institutional and ideological conditions, we can refer to these as 
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‘regimes of social cohesion’ where a regime is an ‘ideal type’ in Weber’s sense of a stylised 
model which captures the key and defining characteristics of a particular set of actual social 
forms. Using statistical analysis of cross-country data on institutional and attitudinal 
characteristics of countries – including through cluster analysis, factor analysis and composite 
indicators - we can identify at least three distinctive contemporary ‘regimes of social 
cohesion.’ These are typically manifested in countries which comparative political economy 
identifies as ‘liberal’, ‘social market’ and ‘social democratic’ in their types of social and 
economic organisation.   Arguably, each of these regimes is facing stresses and strains in the 
face of global trends, but each are vulnerable in different ways.  
Historically, liberal societies, such as the UK and the US, have tended to see social cohesion 
as resting on the triple pillars of the free market, active civil society and their core beliefs in 
individual freedoms, opportunities and meritocratic rewards. A wider set of shared values has 
not been seen as essential for a cohesive society. Nor, in the UK case at least, has a strong, or 
tightly defined, sense of national identity and national culture been deemed as central. The 
role of state in welfare and re-distribution has also been played down as a pre-condition for 
cohesion.  
The social market regime of social cohesion differs from the liberal regime in the greater 
emphasis placed on maintaining a wide set of shared values and active participation in 
national formal political activity. It also relies more on the state to generate the conditions for 
social cohesion through welfare and labour market institutions. The social market, it could be 
said, tends to institutionalise the sources of social cohesion.  
The social democratic regime of social cohesion relies, like the social market regime, on 
solidaristic labour market organisation and generous social benefits. As in the social market 
regime of social cohesion it is state-led and highly institutionalised. However, the social 
democratic regime differs in the crucial respect that it places equality at the centre of its 
social philosophy. Each of these models exhibit different fault lines under the pressures of 
globalisation and economic crisis.  
In several respects social cohesion in liberal societies should not be overly vulnerable to the 
forces of globalisation. Markets have become broader and more dominant under the dominant 
neo-liberal paradigm of globalisation. Civic association may have changed its forms but still 
seems relatively robust in countries like Britain and America. And without the need for a 
broad set of shared values, increasing social and cultural diversity should not seem such a 
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threat to liberal societies. Indeed, despite racism and xenophobia persisting in some sections 
of societies, and despite sporadic eruptions of inter-ethnic conflict, these societies do seem to 
remain relatively tolerant.  However, social cohesion in these societies is, arguably, under 
severe threat from another quarter – from the atrophy of those core beliefs which unite its 
citizens. As inequalities widen, opportunities diminish, and rewards appear ever more 
detached from effort and merit, fewer and fewer people are likely to hold to the belief that 
they live in an equitable, meritocratic society. If these beliefs are, indeed, the main glue 
which holds liberal societies together, social cohesion may be severely tested in the coming 
years of austerity.   
In the social market economies the fault lines of social cohesion are different. The countries 
of north-west continental Europe, which adhere broadly to the social market socio-economic 
model, have sought to balance the goals of  economic growth and individual opportunity with 
other more social goals. In this context, a period of economic stagnation perhaps comes as 
less of shock, particularly when the burden of belt-tightening is shared more equally. For the 
most part these countries are less unequal than the liberal societies and social mobility has 
been higher in recent years (Blanden et al. 2005). Here the strains on social cohesion appear 
to be coming primarily from a different quarter.  
Most of these countries have historically placed a high premium on shared values and 
‘national’ culture. In the republican tradition of France, this was based mostly on political 
ideals, derived from the French Enlightenment and subsequent Revolution, but also on a 
strong sense of identification with the French language and way of life (Brubaker, 1992). 
Historically, in Germany, and in the countries proximate to it, excepting perhaps Holland, 
ethno-cultural identity tended to prevail over state identity, since nationalism arose before 
territorially secure sovereign states were established, and when the nation and state could not 
easily be made to coincide (Kohn, 2008). In the post-war years a more civic identity has 
emerged but a broad set of common values and beliefs still tend to be important, in a way that 
they are not in the UK. The problem for these countries is that these identities are now 
challenged by rising social and ethnic diversity and by increasing value pluralism (see Green 
and Janmaat, forthcoming). This is where social cohesion appears to be most vulnerable. 
The Nordic countries are widely considered to be amongst the most socially cohesive in the 
world. On most of the usual measures of social cohesion they score highly relative to other 
countries. Social trust and political trust have both been far higher within the social 
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democratic Nordic countries than in social market and liberal countries since the 1980s.  
Levels of violent crime are generally lower, although Finland differs from the other Nordics 
in having quite high homicide rates. People in Nordic countries perceive less tension between 
rich and poor, workers and managers and between the generations than in the other country 
groups. Perceptions of tensions between ethnic groups are relatively high but on one measure 
at least – the proportion saying they have no problem with having immigrants as neighbours 
– Nordic countries are on average more tolerant than countries in the other groups. What is 
more, while other country groups show declines over recent decades on key indicators of 
social cohesion, the Nordics post substantial rises. Social trust and political trust were 
considerably higher in 2005 than in 1981. People in the Nordic countries seem to have 
become more tolerant during the 1990s and are probably still more tolerant than they were in 
1981. But the Nordic countries also face threats to their strongly solidaristic cultures. 
The main challenge to social cohesion in the Nordic states comes from the long-term 
pressures on public spending and thus on the welfare state. Generous welfare provision is a 
key part of the social contract between the state and its citizens in Nordic countries and 
people are willing to pay the necessary price (in taxes) for this.  However, demographic 
change and global economic forces make the contract ever harder to sustain. Mounting global 
economic competition places pressure on all states to constrain public spending so that 
taxation does not rise to levels which would deter foreign investors and undermine market 
confidence. Population ageing in the Nordic countries, as elsewhere, raises the costs of the 
welfare state, particularly in health and pension costs. So far the Nordic countries have 
resisted abandoning their welfare model. After its banking crisis, Sweden was forced to rein 
in public spending in the 1990s, although not to a point which put its welfare system in 
jeopardy.  A degree of privatisation was allowed which curtailed, to a small degree, the 
universality of provision. Other countries have trimmed spending in certain areas. But 
generally electors in Nordic countries have continued to support high taxes for their welfare 
systems.  
However, tensions clearly exist around immigration and its associated social costs which 
have periodically flared up into political controversy. Can the social contract around taxes 
and welfare be maintained with the additional social costs associated with rising 
immigration?  Is the native population willing to extend its solidarity to immigrants?  
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The issue has been particularly acute in countries like Denmark whose immigration policies 
were traditionally based more on humanitarian than skills-related criteria and which 
consequently had high rates of unemployment amongst immigrant groups, with substantial 
associated social costs. It was opposition in Denmark to the Social Democrats’ open-door  
immigration policies, which saw 60 percent of asylum applications granted in the late 1990s, 
which fuelled the rise of the far-right Danish People’s Party in the early 2000s. This party 
joined the Conservatives and Radical Liberals in a new coalition Government in 2001 and 
this coalition government then passed some of Europe’s strictest immigration laws in 2002. 
(BBC News, February 19
th, 2005). Sweden’s Social Democrat government castigated the 
Danish Government for undermining Scandinavian solidarity, as Denmark’s share of 
successful asylum applications to Scandinavian countries dropped from 31 percent in 2001 to 
9 percent in 2003, while Sweden’s rose from 41 to 60 percent. Sweden, meanwhile, with a 
more skills-based immigration policy, passed new laws in 2008 making it easier for skilled 
European migrants to obtain work permits. 
The immigration debate in the Scandinavian countries well illustrates the social democratic 
dilemma of how to maintain humanitarian immigration policies at the same time as providing 
generous welfare. Whether the adoption of more economically viable, skill-based 
immigration policies will settle the issue remains to be seen. In any event, it would seem that 
the immigration issue defines the limits of social solidarity in the social democratic regime. 
Social cohesion in the Nordic countries is based on a social contract which operates within 
national borders. If globalisation were to erode state sovereignty to the point where such 
national contracts were no longer viable, it too would be vulnerable, even in Scandinavia.  
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